Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 2 The Second Circuit Review: 1998-99 Term

Article 9

12-1-1999

Breaking Up is Hard to Do: A Look at Brazen v. Bell
Atlantic and the Controversy over Termination Fees
in Mergers and Acquisitions
Jonathan T. Wachtel

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Jonathan T. Wachtel, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: A Look at Brazen v. Bell Atlantic and the Controversy over Termination Fees in Mergers
and Acquisitions, 65 Brook. L. Rev. 585 (1999).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol65/iss2/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

COMMENT
BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO: A LOOK AT
BRAZEN V. BELL ATLANTIC AND THE
CONTROVERSY OVER TERMINATION FEES IN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*

INTRODUCTION

Buy on the rumor, sell on the fact. Nowhere is this axiom
more applicable than in the fast-paced, high stakes world of
mergers and acquisitions, where fortunes are won and lost in a
New York minute. The combination or consolidation of several
companies can have tremendous ramifications on the professional and financial well-being of both the most intimately connected and the most remotely interested parties. When considering a potential merger, the companies involved invest time,
effort, and capital in order to determine such factors as eco1
nomic feasibility and corporate compatibility. Make no mistake-tremendous resources are devoted when pursuing such a
transaction. However, what happens if the transaction is never
completed because one party terminates the agreement and
breaks up the deal? What if the rumor never becomes fact?
Generally, the contemplated scenario proceeds in the following manner. One company bids on another and the bid is
accepted. The two companies reach a final agreement on the
terms of the merger or acquisition, but before the transaction
closes, a third company enters the game by making a higher
bid for the company to be acquired.2 Clearly, it is in the inter"This Comment was selected as the winner of the Commercial Law
Foundation's writing competition at Brooklyn Law School in the Fall ofto1998.
' See Mark F. Hebben, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference Break-Up
Fee Agreements in Bankruptcy, 13 BANKR. DEv. J. 475 (Spring 1997).
2 This exact situation can be seen in the case of MCI. British Telecom made a
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ests of the shareholders of the target company that they receive the highest possible value for their stock.3 However,
what about the original bidder, who invested great effort in
pursuing the transaction, possibly in lieu of a different transaction? Common sense dictates that the suitor will seek
some sort of protective provision to shield it from exposure to
such situations.
This provision is formally called a termination fee, but the
term most often used is "break-up fee."4 Break-up fees are
paid to the suitor of a company by the target company in the
event that the contemplated transaction fails to be consummated for reasons set forth in the purchase agreement.5 At its
most basic level, the fee protects the potential purchaser of a
business.6 The bidder often invests a great amount of time and
money in determining the value of the target business7 and
turns to the advice and counseling of lawyers, investment
bankers, accountants, lending institutions and various other
highly paid professionals.8 The out-of-pocket expenses related
to an attempted acquisition represent a tidy sum, and the
break-up fee is often viewed as compensation for the failed
bidder for its expenses in pursuing the transaction? Without a
guarantee of some reimbursement, potential bidders might be
hesitant to expend time and effort on this costly courtship."

bid of approximately $21 billion, which had been accepted by MCI. But before the
deal was able to close, MCI received another bid from Worldcom of nearly $30
billion.
' See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
' See Joseph Samet, Use of Break-Up and Topping Fees in Asset Sales, 746
PLI/CoMM 129 (Nov. 1996). In certain arrangements, as in mergers between companies of roughly similar economic strength, the break-up fees will be reciprocal,
as was the case in the NYNEX/Bell Atlantic merger.
5 See id.
6 See Hebbeln, supra note 1, at 475.
See id. at 475.
8 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 164-65 (1991).
" See Samet, supra note 4, at 133.
1 See Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103
YALE L.J. 1739, 1814 (1994) (citing MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v.
Revlon, 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. 1985)) ("A lock-up provision . . . must advance
or stimulate the bidding process, not retard it .... "). However, Fraidin and Hanson also cite to Richard A. Posner who gives the opposing argument, suggesting
that the pre-bid expenses are considered sunk costs and should not affect the
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The break-up fee has also been understood to compensate
the potential acquirer for indirect expenses related to the acquisition." In any acquisition, the bidder forgoes a different
course of action which may prove to be just as profitable, if not13
2
opportunity costs
more, than the path chosen. There are

associated with any course of action in business, and for a
company looking for acquisitions, the time spent pursuing a
transaction that ultimately fails produces not only expenses
related to the failed transaction, but also forgone profit from a
4
potentially successful alternative acquisition.' The break-up
fee compensates the failed bidder for the opportunity costs of
proceeding with the unsuccessful deal.
As with most major transactions, there are several phases
typical to every merger or acquisition. First, there are negotiations during which the basic terms of the agreement are determined. After an agreement is reached, the deal goes to contract. And eventually, after the terms of the contract are satisfied, the transaction closes and the deal is consummated. Clearly, the break-up fee is designed to compensate for expenses
incurred in the negotiations stage of the transaction, but it is
also conceivable that the fee is intended to compensate for any5
loss incurred during the delay between contract and closing.
There are a variety of risks to which the bidder is subjected
between the time of the bid and the time of the closing, such
as market fluctuations and other unanticipated developments
6
in the value of the target company. The bidder assumes that
risk by "locking in" at the proposed price. In effect, the bidder
gives the target company an option to sell its shares at the
price determined.'7 Therefore, as compensation for that option, the target company offers a break-up fee to the potential
acquirer to offset the level of risk and uncertainty.'

future behavior of rational parties. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 7 (4th ed. 1992).
' See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 10, at 1812-18.
12 See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997).
13 See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 448 (11th ed. 1980).
1 See Samet, supra note 4, at 133.
11 See David Skeel, A Reliance Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 564, 568 (1996) (citing Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 10, at 1815).

Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 10, at 1816.
Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 10, at 1816.
Fraidin and Hanson raise the issue of "inherent delays" in the bidding pro-

16 See
17 See
18
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It might seem that the benefits of a break-up fee are extremely one-sided, but this is not so. The target company reaps
several advantages by offering such a fee to a potential
acquirer. Most significantly, for a company that is actively
seeking to merge or be acquired, the termination fee acts as an
inducement for the initial bidder.19 It may also entice a possible "white knight"' to come to the aid of the target company.
The first bidder or white knight will often attract other such
bidders and will become, in effect, the "stalking horse."21 The

stalking horse's offer is generally considered to be the initial
bid that is then "shopped around" to attract higher offers.22
Thus, the termination fee can be beneficial to all parties involved by minimizing risk for the acquirer and sparking interest in a target company.
This Comment examines the controversy surrounding
termination fees. In light of the recent decision of Brazen v.
Bell Atlantic Corp. 3 ("Brazen") by the Delaware Supreme
Court, there are several aspects of the termination fee analysis
which have come under fire. Prior to this most recent decision,
termination fees were analyzed under the umbrella of the
business judgment rule,' where the focus of the analysis appeared to be more procedural than substantive. However, in
this latest decision, the Delaware Supreme Court enunciated
what has come to be known as the "liquidated damages rubric."' In this analysis, the substance of the fee, not just the
procedure by which it is agreed upon, is open to judicial scruti-

cess and propose the delays as part of the justification for break-up fees. However,
they also argue that there are holes in the analysis of the justification. They contend that the break-up fees do not necessarily eradicate the risk that a pending
takeover may "lose some of its appeal." Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 10, at 1817.
Furthermore, they correctly point out that some of the very same risks that are
supposedly being reduced by the break-up fee could be reduced directly in the
merger agreement. See id.
19 See Samet, supra note 4, at 135.
20 For the definition of "white knight," see BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1596 (6th
ed. 1990).
21 Samet, supra note 4, at 135.
See Hebbeln, supra note 1, at 478 (citing In re Integrated Resources, Inc.,
135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
' 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
24 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYsIs AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (Draft No. 11, Apr. 25, 1991).
' See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997).
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ny. It is this Comment's contention that the two methods
of analysis are actually quite similar, yielding effectively
identical results.
Part I of this Comment examines the two different methods of analysis used in each of the Brazen decisions: the business judgement rule analysis of the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the liquidated damages rubric developed by the Delaware Supreme Court. After the discussion of Brazen, this Comment reviews issues surrounding the inclusion of break-up fees
in merger agreements. Part II examines the several aspects of
contract law implicated in this discussion, the most significant
being the issue of whether the termination fee constitutes
liquidated damages or a penalty. Included in this discussion of
contract law is a brief foray into such fumdamental topics as
unconscionability, just compensation theory, and economic
policy. Part III scrutinizes the several aspects of corporate law
raised by this analysis. The fiduciary duties of the board of
directors of the target corporation are discussed, and great
attention is given to the business judgment rule. Finally, this
Comment examines the effect of the issue of coercion on transactions requiring shareholder approval.
I. CASE STUDY: BRAZEN V. BELL ATLANTIC CORP.
A. Facts
In 1995, Bell Atlantic Corp. and NYNEX Corp. entered
into merger negotiations.2 8 NYNEX circulated a draft merger
agreement in January 1996 that included, among other things,
a termination fee provision.27 The parties had agreed that the
deal was to be structured as a stock-for-stock transaction, and
28
it would be considered a merger of equals. Therefore, it was

See id. at 45. During these merger negotiations, the parties considered the
potential losses each would have suffered as a result of devoting all of its attention on the merger at hand, to the exclusion of some other possible mergers and
acquisitions in the telecommunications industry. See id. With the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, a competitive arena had been transformed for the
regional Bell operating companies, creating numerous opportunities for business
consolidations and combinations. See id.
See id.
2, See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 45.
2
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understood that the provisions of the draft merger agreement,
the break-up fees in particular, were to be reciprocal.29
Throughout the negotiations, the main problem surrounding the termination fee was in determining how to value lost
transactions for either party. Both parties agreed that the
possibility of forgoing alternative transactions pending the
completion of this merger was a real concern and that the
opportunity cost of a failed consummation should be a serious
consideration."0 Furthermore, in valuing the break-up fee,
negotiators took into account the size of such fees in other
merger agreements found reasonable by Delaware courts, as
well as the time during which the parties would be subject to
restrictive covenants under the draft merger agreement while
regulatory approvals were sought. 1
In the end, the two companies, in the Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger dated as of April 21,
1996 (the "Merger Agreement"), agreed that $550 million,
which represented approximately 2% of Bell Atlantic's market
capitalization, was a fair and reasonable estimate of the value
of the opportunity cost and other losses associated with a termination of the merger." Moreover, the termination fee represented a percentage of the market capitalization consistent
with percentages previously approved by Delaware courts in
earlier transactions.33
The fee was broken down into two parts. The first tier of
the fee provided that either party would be required to pay
$200 million if there were both a competing acquisition offer
for that party and either (a) a failure to obtain stockholder
approval or (b) a termination of the agreement. 4 The second
tier provided that if a competing transaction were consummated within eighteen months of the termination of the Merger
29 See

id.

See id.

31 See id.

See id. Courts have taken several factors into account in considering the
"reasonableness" of a termination fee. In one instance, the court stated: "[A] breakup fee should constitute a fair and reasonable percentage of the proposed purchase
price, and should be reasonably related to the risk, effort and expense of the prospective purchaser." In re Integrated Resources, Inc. 147 B.R. 650, 662 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992).
'3 See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 45.
3 See id.
22
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Agreement between Bell Atlantic and NYNEX, the consummating party would be required to pay an additional $350
35
million to its disappointed merger partner.
In February of 1997, Lionel I. Brazen, a Bell Atlantic
stockholder, filed a class action suit against Bell36Atlantic and
its directors for declaratory and injunctive relief. He alleged
that Bell Atlantic's Board of Directors had breached their fiduciary duty to the company's shareholders by negotiating an
unconscionably high termination fee in the Merger Agreement. 7 He further alleged that they had done this in order to
restrict and impair the exercise of the fiduciary duty of the

'

See id.

3 See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. Civ. A. 14976, 1997 WL 153810 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 19, 1997).
"7See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 46 & n.1. The relevant section of the Agreement
stated the following regarding termination fees:
"If (I) this Agreement (A) is terminated by NYNEX pursuant to Section
9.1(f) hereof or NYNEX or Bell Atlantic pursuant to Section 9.1(g) hereof
because of the failure to obtain the required approval from the Bell Atlantic stockholders or by Bell Atlantic pursuant to Section 9.1(h) hereof,
or (B) is terminated as a result of Bell Atlantic's material breach of Section 7.2 hereof which is not cured within 30 days after notice thereof to
Bell Atlantic and (ii) at the time of such termination or prior to the
meeting of Bell Atlantic's stockholders there shall have been an Acquisition Proposal (as defined in Section 6.3 hereof) involving Bell Atlantic
or any of its Significant Subsidiaries (whether or not such offer shall
have been rejected or shall have been withdrawn prior to the time of
such termination or of the meeting), Bell Atlantic shall pay to NYNEX a
termination fee of $200 million (the "Initial Bell Atlantic Termination
Fee"). In addition, if, within one and one-half years of any such termination described in clause (I) of the immediately preceding sentence that
gave rise to the obligation to pay the Initial Bell Atlantic Termination
Fee, Bell Atlantic, or the Significant Subsidiary of Bell Atlantic which
was the subject of such Acquisition Proposal (the "Bell Atlantic Target
Party"), becomes a subsidiary of the person which made (or the affiliate
of which made) an Acquisition Proposal described in clause (ii) of the
immediately preceding sentence or of any Offering Person or accepts a
written offer to consummate or consummates an Acquisition Proposal
with such person or any Offering Person, then, upon the signing of a
definitive agreement relating to any such Acquisition Proposal, or, if no
such agreement is signed then at the closing (and as a condition to the
closing) of such Bell Atlantic Target Party becoming such a subsidiary or
of any such Acquisition Proposal, Bell Atlantic shall pay to NYNEX an
additional termination fee equal to $350 million."
Id. (quoting Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger § 9.2(c) (Apr.
21, 1996). The court noted that section 9.2(b) contained identical language, except
that the term "NYNEX" replaced the term "Bell Atlantic" and vice versa. See id.
at 46 n.1.
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Bell Atlantic Board and to coerce the shareholders to vote
to approve the proposed merger between Bell Atlantic
and NYNEX.38
More specifically, the stockholders contended that
"by agreeing to force their companies to pay up to $550 million in

fees for the failure to obtain the required shareholder approval of

the merger, the Bell Atlantic and NYNEX Boards of Directors have
abdicated and impaired their fiduciary duties and effectively deprived their shareholders of their voting rights, since if they do not
approve the merger, their company will suffer stiff penalties."39

Furthermore, the stockholders alleged that the termination fee
provision failed as a valid liquidated damages clause because it
did not represent an estimate of actual expenses incurred in
preparation for the merger. ° Plaintiffs stated in their complaint that the fees "cannot possibly bear a reasonable relationship to the actual costs incurred in structuring the transaction, they constitute a penalty, rather than liquidated damages-a penalty that is borne by the shareholders."'' Brazen's
contention that the fee represented a penalty and not liquidated damages contradicted a provision of the Merger Agreement,
which (perhaps anticipating such a suit) chose to characterize
the break up fee provisions as "'an integral part of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement and constitute liquidated damages and not a penalty."'2 Thus, we arrive at the
heart of the issue: how should termination fees be characterized? Are they liquidated damages or are they a penalty? Furthermore, what are the duties of the directors in negotiating
such fees?
B. Court of Chancery of DelawareDecision: The Business
Judgment Rule Analysis
The first issue discussed by the court of chancery was
whether the provision in question constituted a termination fee

38 See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *1 (citing Class Action Complaint 1 1).
"Id. at *2 (quoting Class Action Complaint 21).
See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 46.
41 Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *2 (quoting Class Action Complaint
22).
42 Brazen, 695 A.2d at 46 (quoting Merger Agreement § 9.2(e)) (emphasis add-
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43
or liquidated damages. Plaintiffs alleged in the complaint
that the termination fee constituted a breach of fiduciary duty
and that it was a penalty, not merely liquidated damages. In
its reply, defendant stated that plaintiffs

"attack on the Agreement's liquidated damage clause is not based on
a breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, plaintiffs claim arises from the
fact that Section 9.2(c) of the Agreement is a legally invalid liquidated damage provision because it does not represent a reasonable
forecast of damages resulting from any breach of the Agreement.""

The defendants argued that the Boards' determination to include the termination fee fell under the umbrella of the business judgment rule, and thus should be upheld absent a showing that the decision was "the product of disloyal action or a
"
grossly negligent process.
The court of chancery held that "the validity of termination fees depends upon the particular circumstances of each
case."4 6 The court looked to the most recent decision to consider the matter, QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc.4' In that case, the court found that no fiduciary
duty had been breached with respect to termination fees.
Moreover, the Vice Chancellor found that the $100 million
termination fee was the result of an "arm's length"48negotiation
and represented 1.2% of the value of the merger. Thus, the
estimated
fee "reasonably reflected the actual expenses Viacom
49
it would incur in making and defending its bid."
The defendants, who argued that plaintiffs had made a
claim neither based on a breach of fiduciary duty nor on the
assumption that the magnitude of the termination fee discouraged other bidders, drew the court's attention to a previous
case, In re J.P. Stevens & Co., ° in which the court stated,

'a

See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *2 (citing Class Action Complaint

Id. (quoting Plaintiffs Reply Brief, at 2).

22).

Defendants relied on the language of the court in the recent decision of QVC
Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A-2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993),
"

affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).

11Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *3.
'7 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
'8 Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *3.
" QVC Network, Inc., 635 A.2d at 1271.

10542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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if, as appears to be the case here, [a termination fee] is negotiated in
good faith by a board with no apparent conflict, that is well-advised
and follows a responsible, deliberate procedure, I am at a loss as
to
know what basis exists for declaring such a provision a violation
of
shareholder's rights.51

The plaintiffs, however, suggested that the directors failed to
ensure that the fees were valid liquidated damages "reflective
of a reasonable estimate of expenses that either party would
incur in preparation for the merger and contend that this
court's analysis should follow the analysis employed by the
court in Wilmington Housing Authority v. Pan Builders,
Inc."52 In Wilmington Housing,3 the federal district court of
Delaware enunciated a test to determine whether a liquidated
damages provision was valid or whether it constituted an unenforceable penalty.54 The test, now accepted in Delaware, is
as follows:
Where (1) the damages that would result from a breach are uncertain or incapable of accurate calculation by any accepted rule of
law,
and (2) the amount fixed is a reasonable forecast of such damages,
the provision is one for liquidated damages and will be enforced like
any other. Conversely, if the provision fails to meet one of these
criteria, the damages stemming from a breach being easily ascertainable or the amount fixed excessive, the provision is void as
a
penalty.55

Taking the above arguments into consideration, the Brazen court decided that a liquidated damages analysis was not
appropriate in this case.5" Simply because the Merger Agreement referred to the fees in question as a "liquidated damages"
provision, did not make the provision liquidated damages.57
The court reasoned that liquidated damages, by definition, are

sz Id. at 783.
52 Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *3.
665 F. Supp. 351 (D. Del. 1987).
,1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) ("A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy
as a penalty.").
" Wilmington Hous. Auth., 665 F. Supp. at 355; see also Lee Builders
v. Wells,
103 A.2d. 918 (Del. Ch. 1954).
"' See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *4.
17 See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
695 A.2d 43, 46 (Del. 1997) (citing Merger
Agreement § 9.2(e)).
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damages paid in the event of a breach of contract. In the
was
case at hand, however, the event which triggered the fee
5 9 The
not a breach, but rather a termination of the contract.
court recognized that, in many cases, termination fee provisions have been "likened" to liquidated damages, but it nonetheless refused to continue such a tradition here due to the
absence of a breach. 0 Referring to a prior out-of-state opinion,
the court explained its understanding of the essential elements
of liquidated damages: (1) the parties must intend to liquidate
damages; (2) at the time the parties made the contract, the
amount of liquidated damages must have been a reasonable
estimate of the presumed actual damages the breach would
cause; and (3) at the time the parties made the contract, it
of actual
must have been difficult to determine the amount
6 The court
breach.
a
from
damages that would have resulted
held that implicit in all three of these elements is a breach
of contract. 2
The Brazen court further reasoned that even in-state, the
breach of contract is an essential element implicit in liquidated
damages provisions.63 And to assuage any doubt that the fees
in the instant case were triggered by termination rather than
breach, the court pointed to the language of the Merger Agreement which stated that nothing in the Agreement (including
the payment of termination fees) "'shall relieve any Party from
liability for any willful breach hereof.""' In other words, the
Agreement itself conceded that the fees were triggered by
something other than a breach. Therefore, the court concluded
that the termination fees, which did not interfere with either
party's right to recover damages from a breach, were protected
by the business judgment rule and would not be invalidated
absent a showing by plaintiff that the fees' inclusion in the
6
Agreement was a result of disloyal or grossly negligent acts. "
See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *4.
5' See id.
60Id.
"5 See St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995).
62 See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *4.
See id. (citing Wilmington Hous. Auth. v. Pan Builders, Inc., 665 F. Supp.
351, 355 (D. Del. 1987)).
6 Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 46 (Del. 1997) (quoting Merger
Agreement § 9.2(a)(ii)).
' See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *4 (citing QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount
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Once the Brazen court determined that the fees in question constituted "termination fees" rather than liquidated damages, it then examined the very validity of such termination
fees. The plaintiffs asserted that Bell Atlantic's directors
"breached their fiduciary duty owed to the Company's common
shareholders.., by effectively depriving themselves and the
shareholders of their right to approve or disapprove the merger
transaction."'68 In particular, plaintiffs alleged that the
shareholders were deprived of their rights because the excessive termination fees loomed like a black cloud, and, in effect, coerced the Bell Atlantic shareholders into approving
the merger.67
To determine the validity of the termination fees, the court
articulated a two-prong test. The first prong analyzed whether
the directors had breached their fiduciary duty to the common
shareholders. As the court noted, the record revealed that the
-termination fees were the result of an ann's length negotiation.6" Although the fee was initially proposed by NYNEX, it
was understood from the outset that the provision was to be
reciprocal." Thomas McKeough, Bell Atlantic's Vice President
of Mergers and Acquisitions, Associate General Counsel, and
senior negotiator testified that the parties negotiated the size
of the termination fee, 0 guided by a desire to reflect the outof-pocket costs that each party would incur in preparation for
the merger, as well as each party's lost opportunity costs incurred as a result of focused efforts on the deal at hand."
Both parties recognized that due to the recently enacted Telecommunications Act of 1996, which allowed the regional Bell
Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1270 (Del. Ch. 1993); In re J.P. Stevens &
Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 770, 783 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
" Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *4 (quoting Class Action Complaint
[ 23).
67 See id.
See id.
See id. (citing Thomas R. McKeough, Bell Atlantic's Vice President of Mergers and Acquisitions, Associate General Counsel, and senior negotiator [hereinafter
McKeough Affidavit]).
70 Originally, the proposal was for a two-tiered $750 million termination
fee,
with $400 million payable if a competing acquisition proposal was received prior to
either a shareholder rejection or other termination of the agreement, and $350
million payable if the competing acquisition proposal resulted in a merger. See id.
(citing Klaunder Deposition at 17-18, 19-20; Defendant's Objections and Responses
to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories at 3-4).
71 See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *2 (citing McKeough
Affidavit at 2).
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companies to enter into new fields of business, a flurry of
72
merger activity was sure to sweep over the industry.
McKeough stated, "'the prospect of missing out on alternative transactions due to the pendency of the merger was a very
real one."'73
The parties eventually agreed upon the $550 million fee in
question. During negotiations, the parties also discussed various justifications for the fee, including the relationship between the fee and market capitalization, and evaluated the
negotiated fee in light of Delaware rulings on the reasonableness of such fees. Because the plaintiffs offered no evidence
to rebut defendant's explanation of the decision-making process, the court concluded the plaintiffs "fail[ed] to identify
any act revealing that the directors were disloyal or
grossly negligent."7 4
The second prong for the court to consider was whether
the Bell Atlantic shareholders were coerced by the termination
fee. The court first explained its understanding of the business
judgment rule and reiterated its conclusion that the termination fees in the Merger Agreement resulted from a valid exercise of business judgment. However, the court recognized the
exception to the business judgment rule. It noted that the business judgment rule will not protect the Board of Directors if
the existence of the fee and the threat of payment "inequitably
75
coerced shareholder approval of the Merger Agreement."
The court's analysis of coercion was extremely fact sensi76 The court explained that what might be construed as
tive.
inequitably coercive in some circumstances might still be coercive in others, but not inappropriately so." Further, the court
stated that in order to determine whether a particular circumstance of the shareholder vote was impermissibly coercive, one
must consider whether the existence of that circumstance oper-

See ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LITIG. REP. 21, 105 (June 25,
1997), available in WL Andrews Corp. Off. & Directors Liab. Litig. Rep. 21403.
73 Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *2 (quoting McKeough Affidavit at 2).
72

74 Id.

at *4.

at *5; see also Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051
(Del. Ch. 1987); Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch.
1986).
71 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1383 (Del. 1996).
77 See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *5.
71

Id.
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ated inequitably to coerce shareholders into approving the
Merger Agreement for reasons other than the benefits of the
transaction itself.78
Upon examination of the whole transaction, the court
stated that it could not conclude that the existence of the termination fee actually coerced shareholder approval of the
merger. The court recognized that the "possibility of paying the
fee may have influenced the vote," but the court also noted
that the shareholders did not have a chance to consider the
Merger Agreement without the fee, so there was no definitive
proof that the fee had any effect on the outcome.79 As the expected benefits of the merger far outweighed the potential
costs of the fees,"° the court could not conclude that the termination fees had been impermissibly coercive and found in favor
of the defendant, Bell Atlantic."' The Brazen plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Delaware. 2
C. Supreme Court of Delaware Decision: LiquidatedDamages
Rubric
The first issue considered on appeal was whether to view
the provision in question as liquidated damages or as a "termination fee." Unlike the lower court, the Supreme Court of Delaware was swayed by the plaintiffs' arguments and determined
that the proper characterization of the fee was as liquidated
damages."
It therefore follows that the supreme court
abandoned the use of the business judgment rule in favor of
using a different test to analyze the validity of the termination
fee provision. 4
The court placed great emphasis upon the stated intentions of the parties. The court found the express language of
the Merger Agreement characterizing the termination fee provision as "'liquidated damages and not a penalty'" to be persua-

" See id. (citing Williams, 671 A.2d at 1383).
79

Id.

" See id.
s See id.
82 See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43 (Del.
1997).
' See id. at 47.
8' See id.
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sive.8 5 Furthermore, the supreme court acknowledged that the
Delaware Court of Chancery had correctly found that liquidated damages are damages paid in the event of a breach of contract,86 however, unlike the court of chancery, the supreme
court took the position that the termination fee could, in fact
be triggered by a breach as opposed to an outright termination." The supreme court stated:
While a breach of the merger agreement is not the only event that
would trigger payment of the termination fee, the express language
of section 9.2(c) states that a party's breach of section 7.2 (which
provides that the parties are required to take all action necessary to
convene a stockholder's meeting and use all commercially reasonable
efforts to secure proxies to be voted in favor of the merger), coupled
with other88events, may trigger a party's obligation to pay the termination fee.

In light of the expressed intent of the parties, then, the supreme court found no justification for regarding the termination fee in the Agreement as anything other than a liquidated
damages provision.8 9
After the supreme court determined that the provision
constituted liquidated damages, the court proceeded to analyze
the validity of the liquidated damages and eventually concluded that the provision was, in fact, sound. The court enunciated
a two-prong test to be used in analyzing the validity of liquidated damages: "Where the damages are uncertain and the
amount agreed upon is reasonable, such an agreement will not
be disturbed."' 90 Plaintiffs argued that the termination fee
would fail as liquidated damages, as both tiers of the twotiered fee were punitive rather than compensatory, not related
to the actual damages, but instead designed to punish Bell
Atlantic stockholders and the subsequent third-party acquirer
supposing Bell Atlantic were to ultimately merge with another
92
entity.9 ' The Supreme Court of Delaware disagreed. In its
Id. at 46 (quoting Merger Agreement § 9.2(e)).
8' See Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, at *4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 356 (1981).
87

See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 47.
at 47-48.
id. at 48.

88 Id.
89 See

Id. (quoting Lee Builders v. Wells, 103 A.2d 918, 919 (Del. Ch. 1954)); accord Wilmington Hous. Auth. v. Pan Builders, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Del.
80

1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
91 See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48.
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analysis, the court noted that plaintiff did not attack the fee on
the first prong of analysis. That is, the plaintiffs conceded that
the damages that would result from a breach of the Merger
Agreement would be uncertain or incapable of accurate calculation.9 3 The court reasoned that because of the uncertainty
in the telecommunications industry and, specifically, the recent ratification of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
potential damages from a breach of the merger agreement
would be nearly impossible to calculate with any precision or accuracy.9 4
However, Brazen did attack the second prong of the liquidated damages test. The plaintiffs contended that the $550
million termination fee was not a reasonable forecast of the
actual damages that would result from a breach, but rather
was a penalty intended to punish the Bell Atlantic shareholders for not approving the merger. 5 The court summarily dismissed plaintiffs' attack. The court explained that there are
two factors to consider when determining whether the amount
fixed as liquidated damages is reasonable. First, the court had
to consider the anticipated loss to either party had the merger
not occurred, and second, the court had to consider the difficulty in calculating that loss. The greater the difficulty in calculating the anticipated loss, the more likely it will be that the
court will find the amount fixed reasonable. 6 The court concluded that in order to fail the second prong of the liquidated
damages test, as first enunciated in Lee Builders v. Wells, the
fixed amount at issue must be "unconscionable or not rationally related to any measure of damages a party might
conceivably sustain."97
In order to ascertain whether the fee was reasonable, the
supreme court examined the factors that were considered by
each of the parties in negotiating the termination fee provision
of the Merger Agreement. The court recognized four distinct
factors in composing the fee: (a) the opportunity costs of each
party associated with their agreement to deal exclusively with
92 See id.

9 See id.
" See id.
9'See id.
96 See
97 Id.

Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48.
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one another; (b) the expenses incurred over the course of negotiating the transaction; (c) the likelihood of a higher bid emerging for the acquisition of either party; and (d) the size of the
termination fees in other merger transactions."' The court
also recognized that the parties took all of these considerations
99
into account when negotiating the $550 million fee. In its
analysis, the court concentrated heavily on the last factor-the
relative size of the termination fee as a percentage of the market capitalization of the entire transaction-and eventually
agreed with Bell Atlantic that the fee was reasonable and did
not constitute a penalty.' 0
Having decided on the two prongs of the liquidated damages analysis, the court further discussed the differences between
the business judgment rule and the liquidated damages rubric.
Whereas the business judgment rule analysis pays no respect
to the reasonableness, or the substance of the decision, the
liquidated damages rubric pays close attention to the substance of the decision.' It is because of this distinction, the
court stated, that the business judgment rule was inapplicable
in this case.'0° The business judgment rule is simply a process inquiry into the board's decision-making. Under such an
analysis, courts generally give deference to the substance of
the decisions so long as the appropriate steps are taken by the
board in reaching the given decision.' 3 In the instant case,
however, at issue was not simply the decision-making process
by which the directors reached the termination fee. At issue

" See
99 See
100 See
101 See

id. at 48-49.
id. at 49.
id.
Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49.

o See id.
See Paramount Communications, Inc., v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
(Del. 1993) ("Under normal circumstances, neither the courts nor the stockholders
should interfere with the managerial decisions of the directors. The business judg10

ment rule embodies the deference to which such decisions are entitled .... Nev-

ertheless, there are rare situations . . . [where the business judgment rule does
not apply and] a court subjects the directors' conduct to enhanced scrutiny to
ensure that it is reasonable."); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971) ("A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any
rational business purpose.").
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was the fee itself. Therefore, the only way to analyze the substance of the fee was to utilize a test other than the business
judgment rule. In this case, the liquidated damages rubric
was applicable.
The last issue that the court addressed was that of stockholder coercion. The plaintiffs argued that the fee was coercive
to the stockholders in that the stockholders never had the
option to consider the Agreement without the termination fee,
and thus regardless of what they thought of the merits of the
transaction, the possibility of the termination fee was a looming factor. Plaintiffs contended that the termination fee was so
large that it actually influenced the vote." 4 The court was
not persuaded by plaintiffs' arguments, however, and found no
grounds to hold the fee coercive.0 '
The court analyzed the issue of coercion on three levels.
First, the court had already determined that the fee was not
egregiously large.0 6 Second, the court argued that the fact
that the stockholders knew of the termination fee and the
effect it might have did not, by itself, constitute coercion. Last,
the court was unable to find authority to support plaintiffs'
contention that the fee was coercive because it was triggered
by shareholder disapproval of the merger rather than other
events resulting in termination of the Agreement."7
The test for stockholder coercion was enunciated in Williams v. Geier.' The Williams court explained that impermissible coercion occurs "where the board or some other party
takes actions which have the effect of causing the stockholders
to vote in favor of the proposed transaction for some reason
other than the merits of that transaction."'0 9 However, as a
qualification, the court in Williams also stated, "[iun the final
analysis... the determination of whether a particular stockholder vote has been robbed of its effectiveness by impermissible coercion depends on the facts of the case.""'

104 See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49.
105

See id. at 50.

10"See id.
107

See id.

10- 671 A.2d 1368, 1382-83 (Del. 1996).

" Brazen, 695 A-2d at 50 (quoting Williams, 671 A.2d at 1383).
.. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1383.
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In Brazen, the Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that
the plaintiff had provided no evidence to show that the stockholders voted for the merger for reasons other than the merits
of the transaction. In fact, the court proposed that the reciprocal fees may have been an integral part of the merits of the
transaction."' Therefore, the court found that "although the
termination fee may have influenced the stockholder vote,
there were 'no structurally or situationally coercive factors'
that made an otherwise valid fee provision impermissibly coercive in this setting.""' Thus, the court concluded that because actual damages in this case were not easily calculable,
because the $550 million termination fee represented a reasonable forecast of damages, and because the fee was neither
coercive nor unconscionable, the fee was a valid liquidated
damages provision."'
II. CONTRACT LAW ISSUES SURROUNDING THE BREAK-UP FEE
The main problem when dealing with the validity of termination fees is whether to consider the fee as liquidated damages or as a penalty. This issue is at the crux of the analysis of
the break-up fee and influences how the other contested issues
will be handled by the courts. As seen in Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,"' the Supreme Court of Delaware was convinced,
in large part by the intentions of the parties, that the liquidat5
ed damages rubric was the appropriate analysis." However,
this was the first Delaware Supreme Court decision of its kind,
for up until this point, the court had utilized the business
judgment rule to support the validity of the termination fee as
6
just that, a fee, and not as liquidated damages."

See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 50.
...
"12Id. (quoting Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. Civ. A. 14976, 1997 WL
153810, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1997)).
11

See id.

.. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
115 See id. at 47 (referring to section 9.2(e) of the Merger Agreement, which
stated that the termination fee provisions "'constitute liquidated damages and not
a penalty.'").
116 See, e.g., Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. Civ. A. 14976, 1997 WL 153810
(Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1997); QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc.,
635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
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A. Liquidated Damages v. Penalties
Determining whether to view the termination fee as either
a fee or as liquidated damages has major ramifications with
regard to its validity. Under the business judgment rule analysis, a termination fee may be deemed valid, but under a
heightened analysis such as the liquidated damages rubric, the
same fee may be deemed invalid."7
It has long been the rule that penalties agreed upon by
contracting parties will not be enforced by the courts." 8 This
equitable rule, now widely adopted by courts, was designed to
prevent over-reaching and to avoid unconscionable bargains."' In general, the courts show great deference to the
longstanding principle of freedom of contract, and they allow
parties to contract with great leeway regarding primary
rights. ° However, courts reserve the right to intervene with
regard to remedial rights. Legal remedies are provided by
the state in the public forum and are not defined in private
law."
Thus, parties to a merger agreement, intending
the termination fee to be a valid provision of the agreement,
would not want the termination fee to be viewed as a penalty.
Although parties may not expressly provide for penalties
in a contract in the event of a breach, they are entitled to predetermine what damages will be assessed in the event of a
breach of contract by one of the parties.'23 These are "liquidated damages."'24 As first enunciated in Lee Builders v.
Wells,"' several criteria distinguish penalties from liquidated

"' Of course, there is the possibility of the fee being deemed valid under both

analyses, as was the case in Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp. The Court of Chancery
of Delaware validated the fee using the business judgment rule analysis, see Brazen, 1997 WL 153810, and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the judgment,
but used the liquidated damages rubric instead. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 43.
-18See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-31 (3d ed.
1987).
...See id. § 14-31. The courts' refusal to enforce such penalties, as provided in
contracts, is somewhat at odds with the deep-rooted principle of freedom of contract.
120 See id.
121

See id.

See id.
See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 118, § 14-31.
BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 391 (6th ed. 1990).
12 103 A.2d 918 (Del. Ch. 1954).
"'

'2'
124
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damages. The court in Lee Builders stated, "Where the damages are uncertain and the amount agreed upon is reasonable,
such [a liquidated damages] agreement will not be disturbed."'26 Two components, uncertain damages and reasonableness of the amount, constitute the basis of valid liquidated
damages clauses.
John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo break down the
analysis further, identifying three parts to a valid liquidated
damages provision."' The first part requires that the parties
must intend for the provision in question to constitute liquidated damages rather than a penalty.' The second and third
parts are similar to the guidelines put forth in Lee Builders.
The second part requires that the damages be uncertain or difficult to quantify.'29 In discussing this component, Calamari
and Perillo list five kinds of uncertainty: (1) difficulty in producing proof of damages after the breach has occurred, (2)
difficulty in determining which damages were a direct result of
the breach, (3) difficulty in determining what damages were
contemplated at the time of contract, (4) absence of any standardized measure of damages for a certain breach, and (5)
difficulty in forecasting, at the time of contract, all of the possi3°
ble damages stemming from any possible breaches. All five
of these possibilities are entirely applicable to the uncertainty
surrounding damages resulting from a failed merger or acquisition. The liquidated damages provision must also be reasonable. '' Specifically, the damages stipulated in the contract

126

Id. at 919.

," See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 118, § 14-31.
'2" See id. However, it should be noted that Calamari and Perillo go on to minimize the importance of the "intent" component of valid liquidated damages. See id.
In many cases, courts have upheld provisions labelled as penalties, while they
have struck down provisions labelled as liquidated damages. Most importantly,
neither section 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code nor section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts list intention as a relevant factor for determining
the validity of such provisions. In fact, section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states: "Neither the parties' actual intention as to its validity nor their
characterization of the term as one for liquidated damages or a penalty is significant in determining whether the term is valid." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (Comment (c) (1981)).
129 See CALAMARI & PERPLLO, supra note 118, § 14-31(b).
...See id. (citing Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 495, 502 (1962)).
1.1 See id. § 14-31(c).
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must be a reasonable estimate of the provable loss. 13 2 As stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the reasonableness of the amount is measured "in light of the anticipated or
actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of
loss."' If a liquidated damages clause is deemed to be unreasonably high, then it will be found void as a penalty."'
The Lee Builders analysis of a liquidated damages clause
is really paradoxical, then. On the one hand, courts insist that
the damages be uncertain; on the other hand, the stipulated
damages must be a reasonable estimate. As would be expected,
it is the reasonableness component and not the uncertainty
component that is most often the issue contested, hence Brazen.'35 However, as with the case of uncertainty, there are
several sub-issues that arise amid the discussion of reasonableness. Disputes arise in a number of different situations.
Sometimes damages clauses seem reasonable when drafted,
but then appear unreasonable in light of the circumstances
surrounding the breach.'36 Some damages provisions seem
reasonable with regard to some types of breaches, but not with
regard to others.'3 7 Finally, some clauses are drafted to limit
damages to an amount far below those foreseeable.'38 As for
break-up fees in mergers and acquisitions, the actual damages
at the time of breach (or termination) could conceivably be
inaccurately estimated at the time of drafting, especially in
cases like Brazen, where the dynamics of the telecommunications industry have a tremendous and volatile effect on the
opportunity costs associated with any transaction within that
industry. In order to understand how the court deals with
these various issues, it is important to recognize the policy
behind invalidating certain stipulated damages provisions.

132

See id. § 14-31.

133

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

356(1) (1981).

See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 118, § 14-31(c).
"
See Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense of
Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 351, 355-56 (1978).
136 See id. at 356.
' See id.
138 See id.
134
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B. Unconscionability
One of the main grounds on which a liquidated damages
provision may be deemed unreasonable is that of unconscionability. 3 9 The vast topic of unconscionability can be divided
" Prointo two main categories: procedural and substantive.
cedural unconscionability refers to the bargaining process by
which the damages provision is negotiated and finalized.'" In
the field of mergers and acquisitions, procedural unconscionability can occur where the two companies are not of equal
strength and bargaining power.' In effect, one party bullies
the other party over the course of the negotiations as a result
of its position of relative bargaining superiority. However, in a
case where the two contracting companies are of equal bargaining power, and thus there is no procedural impropriety, a
court may still find a damages provision to be substantively
Where the stipulated damages in question
unconscionable.
a court may find them substantively
excessive,
deemed
are
argued in Brazen.'" The key, then, is
was
as
unconscionable,
determining precisely what constitutes an "excessive amount."
C. Just Compensation
Put simply, just compensation represents the theory that
"'justice requires nothing more than compensation measured
45
by the amount of the harm suffered."" At the heart of the
theory of just compensation is the central assumption that
enforcement of an in terrorem provision will overcompensate
139 See id. at 357.

See Clarkson et al., supra note 135, at 357 (citing Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 293, 301-15 (1975);
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489-528 (1967)).
14 See Clarkson et al., supra note 135, at 358. Procedural unconscionability
would be required to invalidate a liquidated damages provision under the business
judgment rule analysis, which was used in the Delaware Court of Chancery decision of Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp, No. Civ. A. 14976, 1997 WL 153810 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 19, 1997).
. See Clarkson et al., supra note 135, at 358.
14

14
14

See id.
See id.

I4 Id. (quoting A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE
ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 1057, at 334 (1964)).
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the non-breaching party.'4 6 The rule against penalties is designed as a protection against unfair recovery in excess of
justifiable reliance, 4 7 as well as a protection against performance of a contract out of fear of a penalty in a situation
where it would be more economically efficient to breach. 8
Both of these concepts are closely related to the termination
fee analysis, falling under the headings of unreasonableness
and shareholder coercion, respectively.
This modern view of contractual damages is founded upon
the premise that a contractual duty is not necessarily an obligation to perform.' Rather, the contractual duty is, in effect,
an option to choose between performance of the obligation or
compensatory damages. 50 Once the contract has been negotiated and finalized, the parties are required to provide compensation equivalent to the value of performance.'' In the
context of the current discussion, the parties may either complete the contemplated transaction or pay the break-up fee.
Provided that the compensation closely reflects the value of
performance, this damages rule is efficient.'5 2 However, if the
compensation constituted in the stipulated damages clause is
grossly disproportionate to the value of performance, then the
damages scenario is inefficient, because one party will be induced to breach in order to reap the benefits of the discrepancy
between the value of damages and the value of performance.
The invalidation of liquidated damages clauses has traditionally been based on one of two theories.' The first is that
the stipulated damages are unreasonable-that they are so
disproportionate to actual damages as to require the court to
infer that the agreement was procured by fraud, oppression, or

14 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 556 (1977).
.. See id. (citing Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 495, 499-501 (1962)).
14" See id. (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 55-60 (1973); H.
Richard Hartzler, The Business and Economic Functions of the Law of Contract
Damages, 6 AM. BUS. L.J. 387, 392-93 (1968)).
14 See id. at 558.
150

See id.

...See Goetz & Scott, supra note 146, at 558.
12 See id.
1
See id. at 560.
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mistake." This broadly falls into the category of procedural
unconscionability, as previously discussed. The second theory
for striking down liquidated damages clauses is based upon the
concept of just compensation, which is closely related to substantive unconscionability.'5 5 The idea is that since the courts
set damages based on the theory of just compensation, individual parties should not be able to recover more than just compensation through a privately negotiated agreement, even if
the contract was reached through the fairest of ways.'56
D. Economic Policy
By examining the economic distinction between liquidated
damages and penalties, the court can often map out the costs
and benefits of the given clauses and, on that basis, decide
whether to let the stipulated clause stand or declare it inval' There are costs involved in all transactions, and mergid. "57
ers and acquisitions often produce some of the highest costs of
all. "58
' The stipulated damages agreement allows the contracting parties to allocate certain costs in the event that the transaction is not completed. In the event that a contract does not
provide for liquidated damages, though, the courts have welldefined guidelines for allocating these costs.'5 9 Thus, any
damages stipulated in the agreement should be in accord with
the guidelines used by the courts in order to insure economic
efficiency and fairness.

III. CORPORATE LAW ISSUES SURROUNDING THE BREAK-UP
FEE
Adopting the liquidated damages rubric, the Delaware
preme Court focused on the contractual issues surrounding
termination fee. The court analyzed the substance of the
not simply the process by which the fee was negotiated. In

154

Suthe
fee,
the

See id. (citing Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1901)).

'" See id. at 561.
156

See Goetz & Scott, supra note 146, at 561 (citing Jaquith v. Hudson, 5

Mich. 123, 133 (1858)).
157 See Clarkson et al., supra note 135, at 366.
15' See Skeel, supra note 15, at 567-68.
159 See Clarkson et al., supra note 135, at 367.
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cases prior to the most recent Brazen decision by the Delaware
Supreme Court, however, the termination fee was scrutinized
with the focus on corporate law issues. To understand the
differences between the old analysis and the new liquidated
damages rubric, it is necessary to discuss the corporate law
issues on which these prior decisions relied.
A. FiduciaryDuties of the Board of Directors
Courts, in applying the fiduciary duty analysis, have consistently held that the use of break-up fees in merger and acquisition agreements is not per se illegal.16 ° Under such an
analysis, judicial review has generally been restrained to a
procedural one--namely, the process by which the directors
make the decision regarding the inclusion of the termination
fee.'' This limited review theoretically leads to a result in
which the termination fee would be found valid more frequently than under the heightened analysis of liquidated damages,
in which the substance (not just the procedure) is considered.
As discussed infra, though, this is not case. In general, there
are several fiduciary duties owed to a corporation and its shareholders, and a breach of any one of these duties may162result in
the invalidation of the termination fee by the courts.
1. Duty of Loyalty
Primarily, the duty of loyalty demands that the director
place the interests of the corporation ahead of his own personal
interests. 163 The director has an obligation to refrain from
any conduct that may damage the corporation, deprive it of
profits, or disable it from making reasonable business decisions
and exercising its lawful powers.' The duty requires that
the director maintain an unselfish loyalty to the corporation

16 See Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the

Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 373 (1987).
161 See id. at 374.
16 See Ellen Taylor, New and Unjustified Restrictions on Delaware Director's
Authority, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 837, 879 (1996).
163

See id.

16 See Curtis Huff, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors in Considering and Re-

sponding to Acquisition Proposals, 1013 PLI/CORP 561, 566 (1997).
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and that there not be any conflict between the director's duty
If the case aristo the corporation and his self-interest.'
es where there is a potential conflict of interest, the director is required either to disclose the conflict or to abstain
from participating in any decision which may have a hint
of impropriety.'6 6
Stephen Bainbridge argues that inherent in all mergers
and acquisitions is the potential for a conflict between the
interests of the shareholders and the interests of the target
directors.' 67 He notes that, in hostile takeovers, if the bidder
is successful, then the target directors face the probability that
they will lose their jobs; yet, if the target directors can successfully ward off the hostile raider, then the target directors will
retain their positions, but the shareholders will forgo a premium for their shares. 6 '
Similarly, in negotiated acquisitions of a friendly nature
the directors and management are often tainted by self-interest as well.'6 9 Because board approval is required in most
cases for a transaction to occur, the bidder may find it useful
to offer certain enticements to the target directors in order to
sway their decision. "' Generally, these "side payments" will'

"' See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 1939). The court stated that
"[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust
lAIn undivided and unselfand confidence to further their private interests ....
ish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty
and self-interest." Id. at 509. This has come to be known as the "corporate opportunity doctrine."
16 See Taylor, supra note 162, at 880.
16 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in

Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 272 (1990). In a footnote,
Bainbridge explains that corporate acquisitions constitute a classic example of
what economists refer to as "final period problems." Id. at 272 n.152. When two
parties conducting business expect that they will conduct repeat transactions, the
likelihood of self-dealing by one party is reduced by the risk that the other party
will punish that cheating party in future transactions. However, in "final period"
transactions, the constraint and threat of retribution disappears. See id. (citing R.
GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 579 (1986)).
1"0 See id. at 273.
.69See id.
170 See Bainbridge, supra note 167, at 273. These enticements can include, but
are not limited to, such arrangements as the "golden parachute," equity in the
surviving entity, employment contracts, fringe benefits, or other compensation
schemes. The "golden parachute" refers to "substantial severance payments." Id. at
273-74 (citing Samnjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (white knight offered target management equity stake); Singer v.
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not be influential enough to materially affect the transaction
price, but they may be influential enough to affect the target
board's decision to accept the proposed bid.17 ' Ultimately,
that board decision may be contrary to the shareholder's best
economic interests. 7 2 In terms of this discussion, the effect
could be that directors would approve a merger agreement
including an oppressive termination fee provision simply because their interests were tainted by the consideration of enticements or "side payments."
2. Duty of Care
The fiduciary duty of care requires a director to exercise
his business judgment in acting on behalf of the corporation. "73
' The director must act in good faith and with due care
and must inform himself of all material information reasonably
available to him at the time of a decision.'74 Prior to Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 75 the Delaware courts required plaintiffs to
show that directors had been grossly negligent in order to
prove a case of director liability for breach of duty of care. 76
However, in that case, rather than continue the grossly
negligent standard, the Delaware Supreme Court found Van

Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 974 (Del. 1977) (target directors offered employment
contracts); Repairman's Service Corp. v. National Intergroup, Inc., No. 7811, slip
op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1985), reprinted in 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 902, 907 (1985)
(plaintiff claimed target managers sought "preferences for themselves" in surviving
entity); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A-2d 1050, 1054 (Del. Ch. 1984), affd, 575
A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990) (plaintiff alleged tender offeror modified bid to benefit target
managers)).
171 See Bainbridge, supra note 167, at 274. Bainbridge explains that in negotiated acquisitions, there may be a "'force more subtle than a desire to maintain a
title or office in order to assure a continued salary or perquisites.'" Id. (quoting
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)). He
argues that many directors and top managers derive their identity, in part, from
their organization, and conversely, these directors and top managers feel that they
contribute to the identity of the organization. See id. It is not a purely economic
consideration, in other words-there is a sentimental and emotional attachment
between the organization and its directors. See id.
172 See

id. at 275.

See
174 See
171 488
176 See

Huff, supra note 164, at 565.
id. at 566 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Taylor, supra note 162, at 882 (citation omitted).
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Gorkom liable for a breach of duty of care for his failure to
"'act in an informed and deliberate manner."""
However, there are additional specifications for the duty of
care when it comes to a change in control of the corporation.
When the directors of a corporation are faced with the possibility of a sale or change of control of the corporation, the
directors have one primary concern. They must attempt to
secure the best value reasonably available to the shareholders,
and to that end, the directors must be painstakingly thorough." 8 The Delaware Supreme Court stated this clearly in
Inc.179
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
when it held, "[A] change of control imposes on directors the
obligation to obtain the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders .. ,,."o Yet there are several nuances to these
enhanced duties.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 1 ' the Delaware Supreme Court held that after the point
at which it is clear that the corporation will be sold, the duty
177 Id. at 882 (quoting Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873).

17 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44
(Del. 1994).
179 637 A-2d 34 (Del. 1994).
1g Id.
181 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, a bidding war broke out over Revlon
between Pantry Pride, Inc. and Forstmann Little & Co. Pantry Pride initiated the
bidding by offering $47.50 per share for Revlon, and Revlon immediately defended
itself from this unsolicited bid by rearranging its debt/equity ratio and other various defensive measures. After several changes in the Pantry Pride bid, Revlon
entered into an agreement with Forstmann Little, as a "white knight," in which
Revlon would be sold to Forstmann in the form of a leveraged buy-out at a price
of $56.00 per share. Pantry Pride then increased its offer to $56.25 per share and
Forstmann countered with $57.25 per share, subject to a lock-up provision, a noshop provision, and a break-up fee. This Forstmann offer was unanimously approved by the board of Revlon. Immediately following, Pantry Pride sought a preliminary injunction against Forstmann and sought to set aside the lock-up and
termination fee. In conjunction with that, Pantry Pride increased its offer to
$58.00 per share. The Chancery Court of Delaware struck down the lock-up provision as being tainted with management's desire to protect themselves from liability
as against noteholders. See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc.,
501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985). The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the decision. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986). With respect to the break-up fee and the lock-up option, the Court commented that while provisions of that nature may entice some bidders to enter a
bidding war, if the provisions effectively end an ongoing auction and terminate
continued bidding then it may exist to the stockholders' detriment rather than
their benefit. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
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of the board becomes analogous to that of the "auctioneer"-both have the responsibility of fetching the highest price
for the corporation and the shareholders they represent."2
These duties are not absolute, however. There are several
variations depending on the nature of the transaction at issue.
In a hostile takeover, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated a standard of judicial review to be applied to the Board of
Directors in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co."8' The court
enunciated a two-part test for determining whether the actions
taken by the Board of Directors will be afforded the protection
of the business judgment rule. First, the burden of proof will
be on the directors to show that they had reasonable grounds
for believing that there existed a danger to the corporate policy, and second, the defensive measure in question must be
shown to have been reasonable in light of the takeover
threat.l" The Delaware Supreme Court stated in Unitrin,
Inc. v. American General Corp.,"' however, that these "Unocal standards" would not apply to responses to offers to merge,
i.e., negotiated friendly transactions." 6 The court made a
clear distinction between hostile, unsolicited takeovers and
friendly, negotiated merger transactions.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. 8 illustrates exactly that contention. The Delaware Supreme Court
identified two scenarios in which the enhanced "Revlon duties"
would be implicated. Firstly, these duties would be implicated
"when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking
to sell itself or effect a business reorganization involving a
clear break-up of the company," and secondly, "where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term
strategy and seeks an alternative transaction also involving
the break-up of the company."' However, in the case of a
stock merger between two corporations in which there would

18

See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.

183

493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

1'

See Huff, supra note 164, at 955 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,

493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
"' 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
" Id. at 1375 n.16.
,571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
18 Huff, supra note 164, at 589-90 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc., 571
A.2d at 1150).
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be formed an ongoing business combination permitting stockholders to retain equity in the new entity, the Court held that
this would not constitute a "break-up" or "sale" of the corporation and, thus, would not implicate the "Revlon duties."18 9 In
other words, because there was no sale or break-up of the
company, the court viewed the transaction as a strategic
business combination in which price may not be the primary
motivating factor. 90
3. Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule represents the basic recognition by the courts that it is the role of businessmen, not judges,
to manage corporations.' 9' As Fred B. White, III, and Steven
M. Cooperman put it, "[e]ssentially, the business judgment rule
stands for the proposition that, when making a decision, directors must honestly try to be right-if they do, they will not be
second-guessed about whether they were in fact 'right.'"'9 2 As
shown in the lower court Brazen decision, the business judgment rule is primarily an inquiry into the decision-making
process, not an analysis of the substance of the decision.
The rule has four major components, as described by
Melvin Aron Eisenberg. 9 ' First, the director must have made
a decision and taken some action (or omission).' Second, the
director must have used a reasonable decision-making process
that was appropriate under the given circumstances.' 95 Third,
the decision must have been made in good faith. 9 6 And lastly, the decision must not be tainted by self-interest, as the director is forbidden from having any personal financial interest

"'

Id.

at 590.

"9 Fred B. White, III & Steven M. Cooperman, Fiduciary Duties of Directors in
Corporate Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisitions: Recent Developments, 973 PLIJCORP
609, 613 (Feb. 1997).
,..Diane Holt Frankle, Fiduciary Duties of Directors ConsideringBusiness Combination, 895 PLT/CORP 295, 297 (June-July 1995).
19 White & Cooperman, supra note 190, at 611.
,9 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Director'sDuty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions, 51 U. MIAII L. REV. 579, 582 (1997).
...See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (Draft No. 11, Apr. 25, 1991).
19 See id. § 4.01(c)(2).
'9 See id. § 4.01(c).
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in the subject matter of the decision.197 The Delaware Supreme Court summarized this rule in Unocal, explaining:
The business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company .... A hallmark of the
business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's decision can be attributed to
any rational business purpose .... 198

If the above mentioned conditions are satisfied, the directors
are ordinarily afforded the presumption that they acted in good
faith and satisfied their duties of loyalty and due care.
B. Heightened FiduciaryDuties
As stated earlier, courts generally make a distinction between friendly business combinations and unsolicited hostile
takeovers.199 With regard to a proposal for a business combination, Delaware corporate law clearly states that a board of
directors is under no obligation to approve a merger proposal
based on price alone."0 A merger may be approved regardless
of whether the price proposed is the highest of all of the offers,
simply because there are many more considerations to take
into account than mere share price when forming a "synergistic
business combination." 0 ' However, there is a different standard regarding transactions in which there is a sale of control
or impediments to competing transactions.
These "higher stakes"02 transactions trigger heightened
duties under Delaware law in two instances: when a transaction will result in the sale of control of a corporation, as in the
case of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,23 and when the merger agreement being considered

includes certain impediments to the pursuit of alternative

1" See id. § 4.01(c)(1).
1" Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (citations
omitted); see also Frankle, supra note 191, at 297.
1' See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
200 See Frankle, supra note 191, at 302-03.
201 Id. at 306.
22 Id. at 303.
2" 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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2 4
transactions, as in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co." In
the sale of control cases, the directors are obligated to obtain
the best possible value for their stockholders, as described
above." 5 Generally, though, this situation will not apply to
the transactions in which break-up fees are involved, because
the fees are usually the result of long, but friendly negotiations
that both parties want to succeed. It is the second type of "higher stakes" transaction-those involving impediments to alternative transactions-that are of particular interest when discussing termination fees.
In the field of mergers and acquisitions, it has become
relatively common to include in agreements provisions which
might impede competing offers or compensate one party if the
6
Of course,
transaction is terminated by the other party."
the termination fee does just that: it compensates one party
when the other party aborts the proposed transaction. It follows, then, that in transactions that include a termination fee, directors will be subject to heightened duties
and enhanced scrutiny.
Where impediments such as the break-up fee are included
in the terms of the merger agreement, Delaware directors have
the duty to consider two factors: (1) whether the impediments
are reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate corporate
interest and (2) whether the impediments are reasonably tai07
lored to achieve such a purpose. Diane Holt Frankle explains that a "legitimate corporate interest" is an amorphous
08
term, difficult to narrowly define. One example of such an
interest may be a "synergistic business combination" with longterm goals in which the target shareholders will reap increased
long-term benefits stemming from the new business combination, above and beyond the immediate benefits of the merger.20 9 Certainly, in the case of Brazen v. Bell Atlantic
Corp.,2 1 the merger was one between equals and was initi-

24

493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

20 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.
20

See Frankle, supra note 191, at 305-06.

(Del.
20" See id. at 306 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946

1985)).
208 Id.
209

210

Id.

No. Civ. A. 14976, 1997 WL 153810 (Del. Oh. Mar. 19, 1997)), affd, 695
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ated for the strategic purposes of forming a combination that
would be stronger than the sum of its parts.
In the event that the board of directors determines that
the combined business entity will, in fact, create enhanced
stockholder value beyond that of the immediate gain from the
merger, the board may conclude "in the exercise of its business
judgment" that certain impediments to alternative transactions
may be necessary to protect the proposed synergistic business
combination.2 1' However, the board does have the affirmative
duty to protect the interests of the shareholders by insuring
that the impeding provisions are not so broadly drawn as to
deter competing bids that may offer substantially greater value
to the shareholders. In the end, though, it is a perfectly acceptable course of action for the board to conclude that the longterm value represented by the synergistic business combination far exceeds the value of any likely alternative transaction,
thus justifying the impediments to competing offers.212
C. ShareholderCoercion
The last of the main issues surrounding the inclusion of
termination fee provisions in merger agreements is whether
such fees are inequitably or wrongfully coercive upon the
shareholders, whose votes are required to approve the merger.
In Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,213 Brazen argued that the
break-up fee was coercive on two levels. He claimed that the
voting shareholders did not have a chance to consider the offer
without the fee, and that regardless of what the stockholders
believed about the merits of the transaction, they all realized
that by voting against the merger they would be saddling their
company with a $550 million fee.2" 4 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court of Delaware found for the defendant, Bell Atlantic, and
decided that there was no inequitable coercion stemming from

A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
21 Frankle, supra note 191, at 306.
212 See id. at 306-07. These determinations of value should be made with
the
assistance of and consultation with the management and investment advisors of
the company. See id.
213 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997)
214

See id. at 49.
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215
the existence of the termination fee. The basis for this decision is an important part of the analysis of the termination fee
and is a key element in predicting how courts will view the fee
in the future.
The generic arguments on both sides are as follows. Generally, the party bringing suit will argue that the termination fee
is so large as to coerce the shareholders to approve the merger
simply to avoid the tremendous fee that would be incurred 2by
16
the company in the event that the merger is not approved.
In other words, plaintiffs argue that the merits of the transaction will somehow be overshadowed by the looming possibility
of a gigantic fine, in effect a penalty for failure to approve the
transaction. Thus, the merits are never truly considered by
the voting shareholders and the shareholder approval becomes an act that is finessed through coercion and the
fear of a punitive fee, making the vote ineffective and the
transaction voidable.2 17
On the other side of the argument, the defendant generally
contends that the break-up fee is only as coercive as the other
components of the merger agreement."' As the history of the
Brazen case indicates, the defendant corporation tends to defend the validity of the termination fee under two alternative
theories: either the fee is protected under the business judgment rule2 19 or, in the alternative, the fee represents a valid
2
Furthermore, the defendant
liquidated damages clause.
corporation will argue that especially in the case of a merger
2"2
between equals, as was the case in Brazen, ' the termination

215 See id.
21 See generally id.
217 It is important to note the difference between "voidable" and "void." As de-

fined in Black's Law Dictionary, "void" means "of no legal effect; null." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1568 (7th ed. 1990). Black's elaborates: "Whenever technical accuracy is required, void can be properly applied only to those provisions that are of
no effect whatsoever-those that are an absolute nullity." Id. Whereas, Black's
defines "voidable" as "valid until annulled; capable of being affirmed or rejected at
the option of one of the parties." Id. Black's distinguishes "void" and "voidable" by
stating that "[voidable] describes a valid act that may be voided rather than an
invalid act that my be ratified." Id.
A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
21 See generally Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695
(Del.
219 See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. Civ. A. 14976, 1997 WL 153810
Ch. Mar. 19, 1997).
"2 See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 50.
neither
221 Id. at 45. Bell Atlantic and NYNEX considered each other as equals,
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fee acts as a definite benefit, rather than a potential detriment, to the company.222 The fee is a calculated risk taken
by the target company, whereby the potential benefits and
losses are taken into account. The fee is an integral part
of the deal-not an adjunct component designed to foster
shareholder approval. 3
D. Case Law Regarding ShareholderCoercion
"Coercion," by itself, is a broad term that can be used in a
variety of contexts. With regard to a shareholder vote, some
degree of coercion is arguably almost always present-be it
coercion for financial gain, corporate power, or a host of other
factors. However, in a purely legal analysis, this term is ineffective. The word "coercion" supplies no basis upon which to
conclude whether a shareholder vote is impaired. The Delaware Court of Chancery described the problem in Katz v. Oak
Industries,Inc.,224 stating:
[Flor purposes of legal analysis, the term "coercion" itself-covering a
multitude of situations-is not very meaningful. For the word to have
much meaning for purposes of legal analysis, it is necessary in each
case that a normative judgment be attached to the concept ("inappropriately coercive" or "wrongfully coercive", etc.). What is legally
relevant is not the conclusory term "coercion" itself but rather the
norm that leads to the adverb modifying it.'

Therefore, in examining the issue of shareholder coercion, the
key is not in the definition of "coercion," but rather in the definition of "impropercoercion" which will determine when a vote
is impaired.
The leading and most recent case dealing with the issue of
shareholder coercion is Williams v. Geier.226 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Delaware developed an analysis to determine whether there had been improper shareholder coercion in
a given situation. Primarily, the court stated that "[an other-

one in a position of bargaining superiority due to its power or size. For that reason, the termination fee was reciprocal. See id. at 44.
222 See id. at 50.
223 See id.

224

508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986).

22

Id.

226

671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
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wise valid stockholder vote may be nullified by a showing that
or circumstances of the vote were impermissibly
the structure
coercive. " "' The court went on to explain that "wrongful coercion" can exist when, through an act of either the board or
another party, the stockholders are caused "to vote in favor of
the proposed transaction for some reason other than the merits
of that transaction."2 28 However, possibly the most important
holding to come from Williams was its determination that the
question of whether coercion reaches the level of "impermissi-9
ble," "wrongful," or "inequitable," is extremely case specific."
The court stated, "In the final analysis ... the determination
of whether a particular stockholder vote has been robbed of its
effectiveness by impermissible coercion depends on the facts of
the case."23 °
For the purposes of predicting how courts will handle the
issue of stockholder coercion in the future, the language in the
Williams decision is not helpful. Since the court refuses to
enunciate a clear and invariable test for determining "wrongful
coercion," the best way to analyze the issue is through analogy.
Shareholder coercion is certainly not an issue of first impression. Courts have been forced to deal with it on countless occasions to date."' However, cases involving shareholder coercion through the use of termination fees are not abundant.
Thus, it may be helpful to see what circumstances surround
general findings of wrongful coercion.
In Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp.,22 the Court of
Chancery of Delaware heard a case in which plaintiffs attacked
the validity of a self-tender offer by the defendant corporation."3 In effect, plaintiffs claimed that the tender offer was

'
228

Id. at 1382 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1382-83.

22' Id. at 1383.
210 Id.

See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996); Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051 (Del. Ch. 1987); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch. 1987), affd, 535 A.2d 1334, (Del. 1987); AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Oh. 1986);
Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986); Katz v. Oak
Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No.
Civ. A. 7313, 1985 WL 4449 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985).
"

537 A.2d 1051 (Del. Ch. 1987).
See id. at 1053.
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not of a fully voluntary nature and was, inter alia, wrongfully
coercive." The court held that there are two situations that
may deprive a tender offer of its voluntary character and may
be wrongfully coercive: "(i) cases involving materially false or
misleading disclosures made to shareholders in connection
with the offer, and (ii) cases where the offer, by reason of its
terms or the circumstances under which it is made, is wrongfully coercive."235 The first case is not relevant to this discussion, but the second scenario is.
The importance of Eisenbergis the court's explanation that
wrongful coercion can stem from nothing more than the terms
or circumstances of the offer.236 The decision clearly stated,
"[t]he actionable coercion may inhere.., in the terms of the
offer itself."3 7 As it relates to the analysis of termination
fees, this ruling has major implications. In effect, a shareholder vote regarding a proposed transaction can be impaired due
to wrongful coercion because of the terms of the transaction. If
the termination fee is one of the terms of the proposed
transaction, then it follows that the termination fee, itself,
could potentially be the inequitably coercive component of
the transaction.
In addition to the groundbreaking possibility of wrongfully
coercive termination fees, Eisenberg makes other contributions
to the understanding of coercion in shareholder votes. Citing
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,23 the court in
Eisenberg explained that "[t]he standard applicable to the...
claim of inequitable coercion is whether the defendants have
taken actions that operate inequitably to induce... shareholders to tender their shares for reasons unrelated to the economic merits of the offer."239 Like the test enunciated in Williams, this test evokes the question of whether to consider the
termination fee as an essential, core component of the terms of
the proposed deal, or whether to consider the fee as a peripheral element of the merger agreement whose existence merely
clouds the judgment of those asked to consider the proposal. In

See id. at 1061.
Id. at 1056 (citations omitted).
'3
See id.
.. Eisenberg, 537 A.2d at 1056 n.7.
533 A.2d 585, 605 (Del. Ch. 1987), affd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
"'
Eisenberg, 537 A.2d at 1061 (emphasis added).
'4
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other words, by considering the termination fee, do the shareholders consider a non-economic element of the proposal, thereby diverting attention from the core terms of the agreement
and the true merits of the transaction?
In Brazen, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that
while the break-up fee may have influenced voting shareholders, there were "'no structurally or situationally coercive factors'"2 4 0 that would make an otherwise valid fee provision

actionably coercive in a setting where there had been full disclosure and the proposed fee itself was not egregiously
large."4 In fact, the court found the termination fee to be an
integral part of the merits of the transaction, especially in light
of its reciprocal nature.2 42
In light of this, the claim of inequitable coercion regarding
the use of reciprocal termination fees in mergers between
equals seems weak. In both the Delaware Court of Chancery
and the Delaware Supreme Court, the same decision was
reached-termination fees were a core component of the proposed transaction and were not to be regarded as wrongfully
coercive to the voting shareholders. The open-ended question
remains, however, regarding the fact sensitive nature of the
courts' shareholder coercion analysis. The fees may not be
coercive when they are reciprocal between equals, but does
that apply to one-sided fees, or lop-sided acquisitions? Judging
from the groundwork laid in Williams and its predecessors, the
field is wide open for the possibility of a fee to be found inequitably coercive. It simply depends on the facts of the case.
CONCLUSION

The controversy over termination fees in merger and acquisition agreements is two-fold. At the core of the debate are
figures like Lionel Brazen, who instinctively cringe at the
thought of having to pay such an enormous fee, in the hundreds of million of dollars, simply because the shareholders
refuse to approve a transaction which has been presented to

v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. 1997) (quoting Brazen v.
Bell Atlantic Corp., No. Civ. A. 14976, 1997 WL 153810 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1997)).
241 See id.
242 See id.
240 Brazen
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them with such a threat in place. This is a guttural argument
of outrage stemming from a proposed termination fee whose
amount is so large as to cause one to cry foul. The sheer
size of the fee alone, Brazen would argue, is punitive and
oppressive in nature. On a more analytical level, though,
the issue becomes simply one of just compensation and
reasonable estimates.
In the final analysis, the business judgment rule analysis
and the liquidated damages rubric are not far apart, except in
spirit. The business judgment rule analysis purports to focus
on the procedure by which the agreement, and thus the termination fee, was reached. It is, in effect, an examination of how
the board of directors of a corporation carries out its fiduciary
duties to the shareholders. Amidst that fiduciary duty analysis
are several components that the courts consider. There are
concerns over the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, the protection afforded by the business judgment rule in varying situations implicating heightened duties, and the issue of shareholder coercion. As for the duties of loyalty and care, the
court's inquiry is generally procedural, as the business judgment rule dictates. However, the coercion component throws
the proverbial cog in the wheel of that procedural inquiry.
Because it has been established that shareholder coercion
can stem from the very terms of an agreement, it is obvious
that the substance of that agreement must come under judicial
scrutiny. And if a court should strike down a termination fee
provision as being wrongfully coercive, then it has struck the
fee on substantive grounds while utilizing the purportedly
procedural business judgment analysis.
On the other hand, the liquidated damages rubric is a
straightforward analysis of both procedure and substance and
purports to be nothing less. Under this method of analysis, the
courts will consider both procedural and substantive unconscionability, the concept of just compensation, and the economic
motivations behind the fee. In effect, the liquidated damages
rubric seems to be an enhanced scrutiny. It takes into account
both procedure and substance, two hurdles the fee must jump
in order to be found valid. However, upon close examination it
becomes apparent that the standards of judicial scrutiny under
the liquidated damages rubric are not very different from the
standards under the business judgment rule analysis.
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Both methods review the procedure by which the termination fee was negotiated. Under the business judgment rule
analysis, a procedural inadequacy can invalidate the fee under the theory of breach of fiduciary duty of care. Along the
same lines, under the liquidated damages rubric, a procedural failure can invalidate the fee under the theory of
procedural unconscionability.
The key to this Comment's argument, however, is the
comparison of how both methods will handle a substantive
shortcoming-namely, a termination fee excessive in amount.
Under the business judgment rule analysis, the court may
invalidate the fee if it finds the terms of the fee to be wrongfully coercive. In other words, if the sheer size of the fee is so
large as to coerce the shareholders to approve a transaction
that they ordinarily would not, then the court may invalidate
the fee. Under the liquidated damages rubric, the court may
invalidate the fee on substantive grounds if the fee represents
an unreasonable estimate of actual damages caused by the
breach (or termination) of contract. It is a simple contract law
examination of liquidated damages. The only real question,
then, is whether a fee that has been found to be wrongfully
coercive will necessarily be found to be an unreasonable estimate of actual damages, and vice versa. In other words, will
all termination fees found invalid under the business judgment rule analysis remain invalid under the liquidated damages rubric? As long as common sense dictates, it seems
clear that if a fee is wrongfully coercive, then it is, by its
very nature, unreasonable.
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